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CRIMINAL LAW - VICTIM RIGHTS:
Remembering the "Forgotten Person"1 in the
Criminal Justice System
"My life has been permanently changed. I will never forget
being raped, kidnapped, and robbed at gunpoint. However,
my sense of disillusionment with the judicial system is many
times more painful. I could not, in good faith, urge anyone
to participate in this hellish process."2
In recent years, the treatment of victims of crime in the
criminal justice system has received increased attention.
Commentators have described the treatment which victims re-
ceive as the "Great American Scandal."3 One basis for this
attitude is the belief that the American criminal justice system
has lost sight of its fundamental purpose - to protect the inno-
cent and punish the guilty.4
This Comment first traces the history of the victim rights
movement and the role that government plays in its develop-
ment. It then discusses the purpose and specific provisions of
the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA or
"the Act").5 In addition, the constitutionality of the VWPA
is examined. This Comment concludes by urging that more
attention should be focused on the coordination of programs
between jurisdictions. It further urges that the judiciary re-
main active in the future development of victim and witness
1. S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2515, 2516 (1982) [hereinafter Senate Report]. Hearings and studies
have repeatedly shown that too often the victim has been the "forgotten person" in the
criminal justice system. It has been noted that with few exceptions, victims and
witnesses are either ignored by the system or simply used to identify offenders. Id.
2. Id. at 37, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2543. This is
a statement made by a victim testifying at a subcomittee hearing on the Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982. The victim's interest in seeing changes occur is clearly
articulated by this statement. Id.
3. Young, Victims of Crime: The Great American Scandal, 23 JUDGES' J. 8 (1984).
See also Herrington, Victims of Crime: What the Government Can Do, 23 JUDGES' J. 17
(1984).
4. Herrington, supra note 3, at 17. It has been noted that often the system serves
the defendants, attorneys and judges, but ignores victims. Id. In some cases, the vic-
tims are mistreated and even blamed for the crime. This discourages victims from re-
porting crimes. As a result, it is estimated that more than 50 percent of violent crimes
are not reported to police. Id.
5. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. and FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)).
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rights and that the policymakers pay more attention to the
long-term financial and operational impact of these programs
on the criminal justice system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, victim programs and legislation may be
grouped in three broad categories.6 First, some programs pro-
vide financial assistance for victims. 7 Second, some programs
and statutory provisions focus on the "rights" of victims.8
Third, some programs and statutory provisions are specialized
to protect and benefit certain classes of victims such as bat-
tered women and physically abused children.9
The VWPA and other federal, state, and local legislative
initiatives provide the statutory framework for the current vic-
tim programs. In order to understand some of the underlying
concerns which legislators and judges have raised in creating
victim legislation and applying it in our nation's courtrooms,
it is necessary to briefly consider the history and development
of victim rights.
A. History of Victim Rights
Before government began regulating the criminal process,
reparation"° occurred by the victim taking "blood revenge"
6. Anderson & Woodard, Victim and Witness Assistance: New State Laws and the
System's Response, 68 JUDICATURE 221, 223 (1985).
7. Id. For further discussion of laws providing financial assistance to crime vic-
tims, see id. at 223-28. At present, 39 states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin
Islands have enacted legislation providing compensation for crime victims. Id. at 223.
8. Id. at 223. Many states have adopted laws designed to guarantee a meaningful
role for victims and witnessses in the criminal justice system. These laws generally
focus on keeping victims informed of case developments, increasing their understanding
of the criminal justice process, and providing them with the opportunity to participate
in the proceedings. Id. at 228. See also id. at 228-33 and infra notes 81-90 and accom-
panying text.
9. Id. at 223. Most states have enacted specialized legislation to protect or benefit
certain classes of persons considered to be especially vulnerable to crime. The most
common laws of this type are those designed to protect the elderly, sexual assault vic-
tims, and victims of domestic violence. Id. at 233. See also id. at 233-36.
10. The terms reparation and restitution generally refer to a sanction imposed by
criminal justice officials which requires offenders to make redress in the form of service
or monetary payments to either the direct victims or substitute victims of the crime. J.
HUDSON & B. GALAWAY, RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (1977) [hereinafter
RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
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against the offender.11  After the state took control of the
criminal process, such revenge became, in itself, a criminal
act.12 Restitution, which previously was given by the offender
to the victim, began to be used increasingly to help bolster
government treasuries in the form of fines. 13 Therefore, vic-
tims were often left to recover losses on their own through
civil remedies. 14  As a result, crimes became offenses not
against the victim but against the state. 15 Despite the distinc-
tion now drawn in this area between criminal and civil pro-
ceedings, the view that the state should assist victims of crime
has historical support.
The idea that a society should assist victims of crime has
been traced back to the ancient Babylonian Code of Hammu-
rabi.16 This Code provided that when a person was robbed or
murdered, the city in which the crime occurred would com-
pensate the victim or the victim's heirs for their losses. 17
Modem law, as noted earlier,18 draws a distinction be-
tween criminal and civil proceedings. This distinction was
used in the past to limit the involvement of government in
providing assistance to victims.' 9 Nevertheless, recent devel-
opments in the criminal justice system indicate that despite
the fact that this distinction is drawn, the government is tak-
ing a more active role in assuring that victims of crime are
compensated.20
11. R. ELIAS, VICTIMS OF THE SYSTEM 19-20 (1983) (citing Schafer, Victim Com-
pensation and Responsibility, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 55 (1970)).
12. R. ELIAS, supra note 11, at 20.
13. Id. at 25.
14. Id. at 20.
15. Id.
16. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PUB. No.
1874014, COMPENSATION FOR CRIME VICTIMS 1 (1984) [hereinafter COMPENSATION
FOR CRIME VICTIMS]. This ancient Code has been traced back to 2038 B.C. Id. See
also R. ELIAS, supra note 11, at 20 and RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra
note 10, at 2.
17. COMPENSATION FOR CRIME VICTIMS, supra note 16, at 1.
18. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15. For a discussion of the distinction
now drawn by the law between criminal and civil proceedings, see COMPENSATION FOR
CRIME VICTIMS, supra note 16, at 1.
19. This distinction is used by critics of restitution to argue that because restitution
compensates victims, it is a civil rather than criminal sanction. Therefore, if restitution
is ordered without a full civil trial it is considered inappropriate. Note, Victim Restitu-
tion in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1984).
20. R. ELIAS, supra note 11, at 3. See also Note, supra note 19, at 935-41.
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The victim rights movement gained momentum in the
mid-1970's. 21 At that time, the public became more aware of
the instances where the criminal justice system had failed. As
a result, various "victim rights" organizations were formed.22
In addition, public support of victim assistance led to the
adoption, in many jurisdictions, of public victim compensa-
tion programs and legislation which increased funding for
programs aimed at meeting the nonfinancial, social, psycho-
logical, and advocacy needs of crime victims. 23
B. The Government's Role in Victim Assistance
Many people feel that the key to successful victim rights
programs is the involvement of the state. One of the recent
developments in the victim rights movement at the state and
national level is the use of government compensation pro-
grams.24 This development provides a good example of some
of the conflicting attitudes surrounding government involve-
ment in victim programs.
One of the most controversial issues concerning victim
assistance is the extent to which government should provide
financial compensation for victims. Proponents of direct gov-
21. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 2516.
22. One of the leading victim rights organizations is the National Organization for
Victim Assistance (NOVA). It has been promoting a victim-oriented perspective since
1976. Finn, Collaboration Between the Judiciary and Victim-Witness Assistance Pro-
grams, 69 JUDICATURE 192 (1986). Other organizations advocating victim rights in-
clude Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD), Society's League Against Molestation
(SLAM) and Protect the Innocent (PTI). These groups have been particularly effective
at the state and local levels. Judges have given deference to their suggestions and as a
result, many of the reforms sought by these groups have been incorporated into state
legislation on victim assistance. Payant, Victims of Crime: An Introduction to Their
Rights, 23 JUDGES' J. 2 (1984). For a discussion of the history and impact of the victim
rights reform movement in the criminal justice system, see generally Abrahamson,
Redefining Roles: The Victims' Rights Movement, 1985 UTAH L. REv. 517 (1985).
23. RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 5.
24. For a discussion of victim compensation from state or national funds, see R.
ELIAS, supra note 11, at 22-26. Margery Fry, a British criminal reformer, is usually
credited with the development of the first victim-compensation program. Id. at 26.
There is historical support for the use of government compensation to aid victims of
crime. The Torah, the Code of Hammurabi, ancient English and Germanic law, Greek
law, and Roman law all contained graduated scales of compensation for crime victims.
Note, supra note 19, at 933 n.18.
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ernment compensation 25 for crime victims advance three main
arguments to support their view. First, they argue that soci-
ety should compensate the victim because society failed to
protect the individual from the criminal act.26 Second, they
argue that victim compensation programs lessen the individ-
ual citizen's sense of alienation and anger at society and help
to encourage citizen cooperation with law enforcement agen-
cies. 7 Third, they contend that if government is interested in
the prevention of crime and the apprehension, imprisonment,
and rehabilitation of criminals, there should also be an interest
in providing assistance to the victims of those criminals.28
Generally, opponents of government compensation pro-
grams focus on the lack of financial resources available to
meet the needs of victims. 29 In addition, opponents emphasize
the fact that many crimes are prosecuted at the state level and,
since federal government has no responsibility for the enforce-
ment of state crime laws, it has no responsibility to compen-
sate victims of those crimes.3" Of course, this argument loses
its viability at the state level as state government is responsible
for the enforcement of its laws. Finally, another argument ad-
vanced by opponents is that although victim compensation
can be a legitimate government activity, it is essentially chari-
table and therefore, does not result in an absolute government
liability to its citizens.31
The arguments advanced by both the proponents and op-
ponents of government compensation are reflected in the legis-
25. Direct compensation is used here to refer to monetary contributions made out
of public funds which are paid directly to the victim. Indirect compensation, on the
other hand, consists of governmental programs designed to assist victims of crime.
Compensation, in this latter instance, is not paid directly to the victim, but rather it is
paid to programs which provide overall assistance to victims.
26. COMPENSATION FOR CRIME VIcTIMs, supra note 16, at 1-2. This is also re-
ferred to as the "strict liability theory." See R. ELIAS, supra note 11, at 24-25.
27. COMPENSATION FOR CRIME VICTIMS, supra note 16, at 1-2. This is also re-
ferred to as the "crime prevention theory." See R. ELIAS, supra note 11, at 26.
28. COMPENSATION FOR CRIME VIcTIMS, supra note 16, at 1-2. There are also
several other theories that support government compensation for victims. For a discus-
sion of these theories, see R. ELIAS, supra note 11, at 24-26.
29. COMPENSATION FOR CRIME VIcTIMS, supra note 16, at 2.
30. Id.
3 1. Id. For further discussion of the critics' view of victim compensation, see R.
ELIAS, supra note 11, at 22-24.
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lative responses to the victim rights movement. a2 At the
moment, despite the fiscal concerns at both the state and na-
tional level,33 the proponents of government involvement in
this area are meeting with more success. Legislators have ex-
pressed a commitment to correcting the wrongs which have
been inflicted on victims for too long.34 The VWPA and other
federal, state, and local legislation are the means by which vic-
tim assistance has become a reality in the 1980's. The extent
to which this assistance will affect the victim rights movement
is not yet known, but there is a strong indication that it will be
significant.
II. THE VICTIM AND WITNESS PROTECTION
ACT OF 19823-
A. The Purpose of the Act
The primary purpose of the VWPA is to strengthen ex-
isting legal protections for victims and witnesses of federal
32. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2515. While the purpose behind the Victim and Witness Protection
Act was to strengthen existing legal protections for victims and witnesses, Congress was
careful to state that this would be done within the limits of available federal resources.
Id. Concern has been expressed that there is reason to doubt that the federal govern-
ment will be able to accomplish its goals within the limits of available resources. See
Note, Restitution in the Criminal Process: Procedures for Fixing the Offender's Liability,
93 YALE L.J. 505 (1984). Recent state and national legislation indicates that the legisla-
tors realize that to be effective, additional funding for victim programs is necessary. See
Finn, supra note 22, at 192.
33. At the time this Comment was written, state and federal governments were
facing large budget deficits. In response, many programs at both levels were experienc-
ing cutbacks. Of particular concern is the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, which is expected to force cutbacks in programs. For the specific
provisions of this federal act, see Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985).
34. Legislative commitment to righting victims' wrongs is reflected in the Victim
and Witness Protection Act of 1982 and the fiscal commitment made at the state and
national level. This fiscal commitment is evident from the 1984 Congressional Acts, the
Victims of Crime Act, and the Justice Assistance Act, as well as various pieces of state
legislation. See Finn, supra note 22, at 192. For an example of one state's efforts in this
area, see WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WISCONSIN VICTIM/WvrrNESS
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, PROGRAM GUIDELINES (1983) [hereinafter WISCONSIN VIC-
TIM/WITNESS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM] and Wis. STAT. §§ 949.001-.18 & 950.01-.07
(1983-84).
35. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
and FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2) (1982)). See also Senate Report, supra note 1, at 1-45,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2515-51.
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crimes.36 It also requires the United States Attorney General
to develop proposals and guidelines to meet this objective. 37
Although the VWPA does not call for any increase in federal
expenditures, the Victims of Crime Act 38 and the Justice
Assistance Act, 39 both enacted by Congress in 1984, provide
increased funding for victim services.40
Through its enactment of the VWPA, Congress recognizes
that the criminal justice process has for too long failed to meet
the needs of victims and witnesses. Emphasis is placed on the
fact that insensitivity and lack of concern for victims and wit-
nesses4 1 hurt society as a whole because the criminal justice
system cannot function without the cooperation of those
individuals.42
Additionally, the enactment of the VWPA serves another
important function: it acts as a model statute for state and
local governments.43 Since a majority of serious violent
crimes fall within the jurisdiction of state and local law en-
forcement agencies, the Act provides the guidance necessary
to strengthen victim programs throughout the United States.44
B. Provisions of the VWPA
The VWPA consists of six key provisions.45 Together,
they provide a comprehensive governmental policy aimed at
meeting victim and witness needs in the criminal justice sys-
tem. Each section is considered separately in this Comment.
36. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 2515.
37. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2515.
38. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10601 & 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3013 & 3671 (1982)).
39. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2077 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-97 (1984)).
40. Finn, supra note 22, at 192. See also Anderson & Woodard, supra note 6, at
222.
41. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 2516.
42. Id. See also Victims of Crime: What Judges and Lawyers Can Do, 23 JUDGES' J.
12 (1984) [hereinafter What Judges and Lawyers Can Do].
43. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 2516.
44. Id.
45. See id.
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1. Victim Impact Statements 46
The first section of the VWPA requires that the
presentence report prepared for federal judges include a vic-
tim impact statement.4 7 Prior to the enactment of the VWPA,
no such statement was required in federal courts. The "victim
impact statement" consists of verified information which as-
sesses the financial, social, psychological, and medical impact
of the crime on the victim. 48 The victim impact statement is
regarded as the first step to ensuring that the victim's side is
considered in the judicial process.49
The following testimony, offered before the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee during its consideration of this legislation,
expresses the need for victim impact statements:
The victim of an offense has no standing in the Court beyond
the status of a mere witness - he has no right of allocution
and is often overlooked in the process of plea negotiation
.... we should not prosecute, try, and sentence any defend-
ant without at least listening to the victim's offense-related
needs. It is essential that a victim impact statement be fac-
tual and confirmed; it must be non-inflammatory and non-
argumentative. We never want to be guilty of waving the
bloody shirt; neither are we to bury the bloody shirt with the
victim still in it.50
This testimony reflects two distinct yet significant consid-
erations. First, victims deserve to be heard and consulted con-
cerning offense-related needs.' Second, the exercise of this
right cannot and need not usurp the rights of the accused. 2
Thus, the use of victim impact statements is one way of assur-
46. Id. at 11-14, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2517-20.
The Act's provision requiring a "Victim Impact Statement" is codified at FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32(c)(2) (1982). Id. at 11, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 2519.
47. Id. at 11, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2519.
48. Id. at 13.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 11, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2517. This
statement was made before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law, a part of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary. Id.
51. For a discussion of victim needs and the reasons for considering these needs in
the criminal justice system, see Kelly, Victims of Crime: What Do Victims Want? Why
Should Their Concerns Be Considered?, 23 JUDGES' J. 4, 4-7, 52-53 (1984).
52. See infra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
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ing that our criminal justice system is fair not only for the
accused but for the victim as well. 3
2. Protection of Victims and Witnesses from Intimidation54
Prior to the enactment of the VWPA, criminal penalties
existed to prevent the intimidation of witnesses. 5" The VWPA
now extends these sanctions to protect victims as well.5 6 In
addition, the penalties for violations are greater and the level
of seriousness necessary to constitute a violation is lower
under the VWPA 7 The Act further provides penalties for
instances of retaliation58 and expands the witness relocation
and protection statutes.5 9 Finally, this section of the Act per-
mits the Attorney General to initiate a civil proceeding in or-
der to prevent or restrain the harassment or intimidation of a
victim or a witness. 6°
The widespread and pervasive intimidation of victims is
the primary motivation beyond these changes in the law.6'
Without doubt, victim and witness cooperation in the criminal
53. See What Judges and Lawyers Can Do, supra note 42, at 12-15.
54. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 14-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws at 2520-35. This section is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 & 3521
(1982). For further discussion of the problem of witness intimidation, see Connick &
Davis, Examining the Problem of Witness Intimidation, 66 JUDICATURE 439 (1983).
For a discussion of the provision in the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982
prohibiting threats of retaliation against government informants as not violating the first
amendment, see United States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1211 (1986).
For a discussion of congressional intention in the enactment of the Victim and
Witness Protection Act as not meaning that protection of witnesses falls solely under
the Act, see United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 838 (1986) and United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1984).
55. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 14, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 2520.
56. Id.
57. Id. The new protections for witnesses, victims, or informants apply to offenses
which occur before the witness testifies or the informant communicates with law en-
forcement officials as well as after testifying or reporting information. Protection in the
former instance is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1982), while the latter is codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1513 (1982). Id.
58. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 20, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 2526.
59. Id. The witness location and protection provisions, including reimbursement in
those instances, are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3521-22 (1982). Id.
60. Id. The provision allowing civil action to restrain witness or victim intimida-
tion is codifed at 18 U.S.C. § 3523 (1982). Id.
61. Id. at 15, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2521.
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justice system is especially influenced by the fear of harass-
ment and intimidation. Therefore, this particular section of
the VWPA is an improvement which will help foster greater
participation in the system by victims and witnesses.62
3. Restitution 63
The restitution provision of the VWPA permits the court
to order payment of restitution independently of a sentence of
probation."4 If the court does not order restitution, it must
state on the record the reasons for not imposing it. 65
This provision is the most controversial section of the
VWPA. Some commentators66 and at least one court67 have
stated that the restitution provisions are unconstitutional. 8
Nevertheless, recent court holdings, including one of an appel-
62. In addition to the VWVPA, the 1980 ABA approved model statute to reduce
victim and witness intimidation has been adopted in some form by at least five states:
California, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Generally, while
the states vary considerably in form, each one utilizes a form of court orders. Id. at 28-
29, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2534-35.
63. Id. at 30-33, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2536-39.
See also infra notes 104-41 and accompanying text. For a definition of the term
restitution, see supra note 10.
64. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws at 2536. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982). Prior to the enactment of
the VWPA, restitution could only be ordered in federal cases under the federal proba-
tion statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). Note, supra note 32, at 507 n.5.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (1982). This section provides that "[i]f the court does
not order restitution, or orders only partial restitution, under this section, the court
shall state on the record the reasons therefor." Id.
66. See Note, The Unconstitutionality of the Victim and Witness Protection Act
Under the Seventh Amendment, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1590 (1984). See also Project,
Congress Opens Pandora's Box - The Restitution Provisions of the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 507, 573 (1984).
67. United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983), modified sub nom.
United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 2362
(1985).
The defendants in this case, Carlton Welden, Edward Eugene Satterfield, and Perry
Don Allison, were convicted of kidnapping a woman from her home in Georgia and
forcing her to accompany them to Alabama. During the commission of this crime, the
woman's boyfriend was killed. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 831-32.
In a subsequent case, the court held that "victims of the offense" for purposes of the
VWPA include all who are hurt as a result of criminal activity. Thus, not only was the
individual who was kidnapped entitled to recover under the restitution provisions of the
VWPA, but so was the estate of an individual who was killed during the kidnapping and
the owner of an automobile which was damaged during the kidnapping. United States
v. Allison, 599 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ala.), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 2362 (1985).
68. Welden, 568 F. Supp. at 534-36.
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late court reversing the court which had held the restitution
provision unconstitutional,69 uphold the constitutionality of
this provision. 70  The constitutionality of the VWPA is dis-
cussed in a later section of this Comment.7 1
4. Federal Accountability for Escape or Release 72
Thomas Whisenhart had been sentenced to twenty years in a
federal prison for severely and brutally beating a female vic-
tim. He was diagnosed as a paranoid, schizophrenic
psychotic and long-term psychiatric treatment was recom-
mended. Nevertheless, his sentence was reduced to ten years
and he was released. After his release, he brutally beat and
murdered two women and kidnapped, raped, murdered, and
mutilated a third woman.73
The victims of this crime, the children and husband of the
third murdered woman, sued the federal government, con-
tending that the government's release of Whisenhart consti-
tuted gross negligence 74 and as a result the government should
be held civilly liable.75
In order to maintain this action, prior to the VWPA, the
victim's claim had to survive a motion for summary judgment
based upon the exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act
which exempts conduct falling under a "discretionary func-
69. TheWelden decision was modified in United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827
(11 th Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 2362 (1985).
70. See United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 93 (1985); United States v. Watchman, 749 F.2d 616, 617 (10th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1089, (1984); and
United States v. Florence, 741 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (8th Cir. 1984). These courts have
all held that an order of restitution imposed under the VWPA is a criminal, rather than
civil, penalty. United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 479 (3d Cir. 1985). Thus, the
VWPA has been found by these courts to not violate the jury trial guarantee of the
seventh amendment. Palma, 760 F.2d at 479-80. See also Note, The Constitutionality
of the Victims' Restitution Provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 70 VA. L.
REv. 1059 (1984) and infra notes 98-149 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 98-149 and accompanying text.
72. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 33-37, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2539-43.
73. Id. at 35, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2541. For a
complete description of this reported case, see Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132
(5th Cir. 1981).
74. Payton, 636 F.2d at 134-35.
75. Id. at 135. The civil action was brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act which is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) & 2671-80 (1982).
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tion" classification.76 Under the VWPA, there is a specific
provision which allows victims or their families to hold the
federal government civilly liable for injuries or property losses
suffered at the hands of an escaped or released individual." In
order to recover, the federal government must still be found to
have been grossly negligent.78
Despite two major arguments opposing this provision,79
the overwhelming view of the Senate Judiciary Committee
was that victims should have some means of redress. This in-
cludes redress by holding the government civilly liable for
gross negligence in permitting release or failing to prevent the
escape of criminals.8 °
5. Federal Guidelines to Victim Rights81
Some rights of law-abiding Americans are so fundamental as
to cry out for protection ... they include the right to civi-
lized and compassionate treatment when we have fallen vic-
tims to a law-breaker.8 2
Too often, victims in the criminal justice system are
treated as little more than sources of information and evi-
76. Payton, 636 F.2d at 134. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides a limited
waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions. See id. at 135-44. If conduct is consid-
ered a "discretionary function," it is exempt from the Federal Tort Claims Act. In
determining whether conduct is within this exemption, the court reviews the nature of
the loss imposed by the governmental injury, assesses the nature and quality of the
government activity causing the injury, and considers whether the vehicle of a tort suit
provides the relevant standard of care, be it professional or reasonableness, for evalua-
tion of the governmental decision. Id. at 144-46. In addition, a factor that the court in
Payton considered was the lack of a federal victim compensation program. Id. at 145.
77. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 33, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 2539. This section is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
78. Id.
79. The two arguments against this section of the VWPA are that this provision
will lead to a multiplicity of lawsuits and have a chilling effect upon independent parole
decisions. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 36, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2542. As this provision limits liability to cases which constitute gross
negligence, it is unlikely that there will be the potential for adverse impact on the gov-
ernment under the multiplicty of lawsuits argument. The chilling effect argument also
fails in light of the fact that there is ample room for vigorous government implementa-
tion of policies when the limit placed on those actions is measured by a gross negligence
standard. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 37-42, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2543-48.
82. Id. at 38, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2544.
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dence.83 One of the major complaints victims express about
the criminal justice system is that their feelings and needs are
rarely taken into consideration.84 As a result, fewer victims
and witnesses are willing to get involved.
In response to the demand for the establishment of some
basic guidelines for the treatment of victims and witnesses in
the criminal process, Congress, in enacting the VWPA, re-
quired the Attorney General to develop and implement guide-
lines to meet this objective.8 5 On July 9, 1983, the Attorney
General issued these guidelines.86
This section of the VWPA endorses what some current
state and local programs already require from law enforce-
ment officials. 87 It also clarifies what will be expected of fed-
eral law enforcement officials in the future when dealing with
victims and witnesses of crimes.
A key part of this provision is the enactment of legislation
in the form of a "victim's bill of rights. ' 88 The use of a basic
bill of rights is justified for two reasons. First, because simple
justice demands it;89 second, because the clarification of the
role of victims and witnesses is absolutely essential to a suc-
cessful criminal justice system that depends so heavily upon
the cooperation of those individuals.90
83. Resnick, The Trauma of Rape and the Criminal Justice System, 9 JUST. Sys. J.
52 (1984).
84. See Kelly, supra note 51, at 5.
85. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 37, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 2543.
86. For a description of these guidelines, see United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp.
516, 520-25 (N.D. Ala. 1983), modified sub nom. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d
827 (1lth Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 2362 (1985).
87. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 38, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws at 2544. For an example of the application of these requirements at the
state and local level, see Wis. STAT. §§ 949.001-.18 & 950.01-.07 (1983-84).
88. For an example of a "victim's bill of rights," see Wis. STAT. §§ 950.01-.07
(1983-84).
89. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 39, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 2545.
90. Id.
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6. Profit by Criminal from Sale of Story91
Public awareness of the need for statutory provisions
which prevent direct profit from the sale of a criminal's story
is a fairly recent phenomenon. 92 The sixth and final provision
of the VWPA addresses this situation.
The "criminal turned author"93 situation is one which
often creates feelings of irritation and anger. These feelings
are not only felt by victims but by society in general. Many
people feel there is something tremendously wrong with a sys-
tem which allows a criminal to profit financially from a crime
which he or she committed while victims of crime go largely
uncompensated. While this problem is not the fault solely of
the criminal justice system,94 it is possible for the system to
provide some means by which limitations are placed upon the
ability of criminals to profit from their illegal activities.
The VWPA requires the Attorney General to present to
Congress any laws it believes are necessary to ensure that "no
federal felon will profit financially from notoriety directly re-
lated to the criminal act until restitution rights of the victim
are determined by forfeiture or civil proceeding.195 Recently,
Congress did pass legislation to limit the ability of a criminal
to profit from the sale of his or her story.96 At the state level,
at least one jurisdiction has adopted legislation to limit a crim-
inal's ability to profit from illegal acts.9v
91. Id. at 42-44, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2548-50.
For a discussion of the concern that murderers might sell their stories to a publisher as a
proper ground for ordering restitution beyond defendants' present and foreseeable
ability to pay, see United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1985), modified, 777
F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1647 (1986). See also Anderson &
Woodard, supra note 6, at 227-28 for a discussion of the states' use of escrow accounts
for offender's profits.
92. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 42, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 2548.
93. Id.
94. Id. The print and broadcast media and paperback journalistic fascination with
sensational, true life stories creates a climate in which criminals-turned-authors can
flourish. Id.
95. Id.
96. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2175 (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3671-72 (1984)).
97. See Wis. STAT. § 949.165 (1983-84).
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III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE VWPA
The constitutionality of the VWPA has been challenged
on first,98 fifth, 99 sixth,1°° seventh, 0 1 eighth, 102 and four-
teenth10 3 amendment grounds. Most of the constitutional
questions raised to date involve the restitution provisions of
the Act. Therefore, this Comment focuses primarily on the
constitutionality of those provisions. In addition, the balanc-
ing of the constitutional rights of the accused against those of
the victim is considered.
A. Constitutionality of Restitution Provisions in the VWPA
The restitution provisions of the VWPA' ° require that a
federal court, as part of the sentence of each defendant, order
the defendant to make restitution to each "victim" or state in
the record a legitimate reason for not doing so.'05 In United
States v. Welden, 0 6 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama was directly confronted with
determining the overall constitutionality of this Act and the
restitution provisions contained therein. 0 7 That court found
that the restitution provisions violated the seventh amend-
98. United States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1211 (1986). In Velasquez, the issue of whether the retaliation statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1513, a part of the VWPA, violated the first amendment was raised. Id. at 1356.
That court stated that the first amendment is "remotely if at all involved" in this case.
The threats involved did not relate to ideas or advocacy. Therefore, the statute did not
violate the first amendment. Id. at 1356-58.
99. For a discussion of the challenge to the VWPA based on the fifth amendment,
see United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 534-35 (N.D. Ala. 1983), modified sub
nom. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2362 (1985). See also infra notes 104-13, 128-41 and accompanying text.
100. For a discussion of the challenge to the VWPA based on the sixth amend-
ment, see Welden, 568 F. Supp. at 534.
101. For a discussion of the challenge to the VWPA based on the seventh amend-
ment, see id. See also infra notes 104-27 and accompanying text.
102. For a discussion of the challenge to the VWPA based on the eighth amend-
ment, see Welden, 568 F. Supp. at 532-33.
103. For a discussion of the challenge to the VWPA based on the fourteenth
amendment, see id. at 534-35.
104. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982). The restitution provisions are codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579 & 3580 (1982).
105. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579(a)(1) & 3579(a)(2) (1982).
106. 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983), modified sub nom. United States v. Sat-
terfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2362 (1985).
107. See id.
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ment right to a jury trialx10 and the fifth amendment require-
ments of "due process" and "equal protection." 10 9 On appeal,
the constitutionality of the Act was upheld and the district
court's decision reversed.110 To date, the United States
Supreme Court has not made any direct rulings on the consti-
tutionality of the VWPA.
While some commentators have argued that the VWPA,
as currently written, is unconstitutional,1 others have stated
that the Act is constitutional.11 2 Court rulings indicate that
the latter view is correct.1 1 3 This Comment is in accord with
the view that the Act is constitutional and finds that the resti-
tution provisions are most properly characterized as criminal,
not civil, proceedings.
1. Restitution Appropriate in Criminal Justice System
Critics of the restitution provisions argue that the objec-
tives of criminal and civil law are distinct.11 4 They claim that
the focus of civil law is to compensate for private wrongs,
whereas the focus of criminal law is to redress public wrongs
and to protect society. 5 Therefore, because restitution is a
form of compensation, it does not belong in the criminal jus-
108. Id. at 534. The seventh amendment provides that "the right to a jury trial
shall be preserved" in civil cases "where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dol-
lars." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
In Welden, the court held that § 3479(h) turns restitution into a civil proceeding and
therefore, hearings must be in compliance with the seventh amendment. Welden, 568
F. Supp. at 534.
109. Welden, 568 F. Supp. at 534-35. The concern under the fifth amendment is
that the statute is subject to arbitrary and uneven exercises of power which make it
inconsistent with due process and equal protection considerations. Id.
110. See United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2362 (1985).
111. See generally Note, supra note 66; see also Project, supra note 66, at 573.
112. See Note, supra note 19, at 932; see generally Note, supra note 70.
113. United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Keith,
754 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 93 (1985); United States v. Watchman,
749 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 599 (1985); Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827; United States v. Florence,
741 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1984).
114. Note, supra note 19, at 934-35. This distinction must be found to exist if the
critics' position, that the restitution provisions of the VWPA are unconstitutional, is to
be maintained. See Florence, 741 F.2d at 1067.
115. Note, supra note 19, at 935.
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tice system.1 16 In addition, critics argue that restitution may
not be ordered unless there is an opportunity for a full jury
trial on the question of damages. To allow a sentencing judge
to order restitution, they argue, violates due process because
there is no right to a jury trial with various procedural
safeguards. 117
The major flaw in the critics' arguments is that they fail to
properly categorize restitution. Their assertion that restitu-
tion is improper as a criminal sentence depends upon a sharp
distinction being drawn between criminal and civil law in this
area. In reality, the criminal and civil systems share certain
objectives and some areas of the law reflect this overlap." 8
Restitution is a good example of an area where the civil
and criminal systems overlap. Although restitution appears
to share with civil law its purpose of compensation, its princi-
pal value is its function as a corrective device." 9 Conse-
quently, restitution can play a proper and potentially
significant role in the criminal system.
The courts now recognize that the restitution provisions of
the VWPA impose criminal and not civil penalties. In United
States v. Satterfield,2 0 the court stated that "[iun drafting the
restitution provisions of the VWPA, Congress made clear in
both the language of the statute and its accompanying legisla-
tive history that victim restitution would be imposed as a
criminal, rather than civil, penalty."' 12 1
Judges recognize the value of restitution as do legislatures
and community service programs. 22  Ordering restitution
forces the defendant to acknowledge the harm he has caused
in concrete terms. 123 It impresses upon the offender his re-
116. Id. This view only takes into consideration one of the purposes of restitution.
The principal value of restitution is its function as a corrective device. Id. at 937-41.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 935-37.
119. Id. at 937-41. In addition, restitution, as an aspect of criminal punishment,
has a long history that goes back further than either the American or English systems of
justice. Florence, 741 F.2d at 1067. See also supra notes 10-23 and accompanying text.
120. 743 F.2d 827 (1lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2362 (1985).
121. 743 F.2d at 836; see also Palma, 760 F.2d at 479-80 and supra note 70.
122. Note, supra note 19, at 937-38. The judges and community service groups
especially recognize the rehabilitative value of restitution. Id.
123. Id. at 938 (citations omitted).
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sponsibility to others.124 Restitution can also act as an effec-
tive deterrent and may be more effective than fines. 125 Finally,
restitution serves the retributive goals of punishment. 126 A
civil suit, initiated by a victim, cannot serve these same objec-
tives.127 Therefore, as restitution not only compensates vic-
tims, but also promotes the criminal system's goals of
rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution, it is a proper part
of the criminal system and the VWPA provisions are
appropriate.
2. Restitution at Sentencing Satisfies Due
Process Concerns
Critics of restitution argue that not only is the defendant
denied his right to a jury trial under the seventh amendment
as the proceeding is civil in nature, but also that ordering res-
titution at the sentencing stage violates the defendant's due
process and equal protection rights.1 28 They argue that the
VWPA is arbitrary and lacks ascertainable standards.1 29 They
claim that "Congress was not only a poor draftsman, but in
many respects it unleashed the courts without providing them
standards, such as rules of evidence, rules of discovery, bur-
dens of proof, requirements of notice, requirements of stand-
ing, and the like." 3 '
The assertion that the Act is unconstitutional because it
violates the due process and equal protection rights is without
124. Id.
125. Id. Restitution requires that the defendant pay the victim rather than the
abstract, impersonal state. This impresses upon the defendant that he or she has a
responsibility to others. Id. "To the offender's pocket it makes no difference whether
what he has to pay is a fine, costs, or compensation. But to his understanding of the
nature of justice it may make a great deal." Id. at 938 n.54 (quoting M. Fry, ARMS OF
THE LAW 124 (1954)).
126. See id. at 937-41.
127. See id. at 941. While a victim may sue an offender after the state has imposed
criminal sanctions, the use of restitution provides not only benefits for the victim but for
society as a whole. Society may benefit from the correctional effects of restitution. Ad-
ditionally, because the victim may not find it worthwhile to pursue a civil action, the
public benefits of restitution would be lost if it were not part of the criminal system. Id.
128. Id. at 935 & 941-46.
129. Restitution Provisions of 1982 Victim Protection Act Challenged, 23 JUDGES' J.
at 19.
130. Id. For a discussion of the procedural safeguards that are in the VWPA, see
United States v. Florence, 741 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (8th Cir. 1984).
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merit. Due process cannot be precisely defined. It is a flexible
notion which provides for changes to accomodate the specific
procedural requirements for each case."' Furthermore, the
court's authority to order restitution flows solely from a find-
ing of guilt.132 Restitution does not infringe upon one's right
to liberty or property; once a defendant has been convicted,
these interests become conditional and their deprivation does
not require the same safeguards provided prior to
conviction. 133
In addition, the defendant's qualified right to liberty and
property must be balanced against the government's interest
in furthering the objectives of criminal law. 34 As one com-
mentator noted:
The government has already provided the defendant a com-
plete jury trial - with greater procedural protections and a
more rigorous standard of proof than those required in a
civil action - to determine whether punishment may be im-
posed. Formal procedures, such as jury determination of the
amount of restitution or a full civil trial on the issue of dam-
ages, would frustrate achievement of restitution's correc-
tional aims by focusing the inquiry on compensation of the
victim rather than on correction of the offender. Further-
more, the increased cost and delay of a civil jury trial would
threaten the government's ability to impose criminal sanc-
tions effectively.131
As restitution under the VWPA serves the dual purpose of
compensating victims and acting as a corrective device, due
process safeguards cannot be considered solely with regard to
the criminal's concerns but must consider society's interests as
well.
131. Note, supra note 19, at 943.
132. Id. at 944. A civil action, in contrast, typically concerns the relation between
two individuals and determines which of the two should bear an existing loss. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. "Due process involves the balancing of three factors: (1) the nature of the
private interest affected; (2) the government's interest, including the administrative and
fiscal burdens that various procedures would entail; and (3) the risk of error associated
with each conceivable procedural alternative." Id. at 943 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
135. Id. at 944-45 (footnotes omitted).
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Of course, orders of restitution must meet the same proce-
dural safeguards required by other forms of punishment. 136
At a minimum, this should include notice and a "meaningful
opportunity to be heard." 13 7 The VWPA does have some po-
tential due process problems but as one court stated, "the pos-
sibility of due process violations... [occurring] in particular
cases in the future... does not render the statute unconstitu-
tional on its face."1 38 The rights delineated by Rule 32 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, if properly enforced by
the sentencing judge, should afford the defendant timely no-
tice and an opportunity to respond.1 39
In addition, the VWPA provides that restitution must be
tailored to the individuality of the defendant as this is vital to
the rehabilitative goals of sentencing.140 Thus, the court can
order restitution only after it considers the financial resources
and earning ability of the defendant's dependents.'41 No such
consideration would be provided if this were truly a civil pro-
ceeding. This is a further manifestation that restitution is a
criminal sanction and not a civil action. It also indicates that
restitution can be an effective yet fair tool in the criminal jus-
tice system.
B. Balancing the Rights of the Accused with the Rights of
the Victim
Victim rights can be accomplished without impairing the
constitutional and statutory safeguards provided to all persons
charged with a crime.' 42 The goal is not to reduce the rights
guaranteed to the defendants, but rather to assure that victim
and witness rights are also guaranteed. 143 The focus of the
136. Id. at 943-44. For a discussion of the VWPA meeting procedural safeguards,
see Florence, 741 F.2d at 1066-69.
137. Note, supra note 19, at 944 n.92 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
377 (1971)).
138. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 829 (11th Cir. 1984), cert denied,
105 S. Ct. 2362 (1985).
139. Id. at 840-41; see also Florence, 741 F.2d at 1068-69.
140. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 836-37.
141. Id. Where a court fails to consider the financial needs and earning ability of a
defendant's dependents, the restitution order will not be allowed to stand. United States
v. Gomer, 764 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1985).
142. What Judges and Lawyers Can Do, supra note 42, at 13.
143. Id.
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victim fights movement is to see that the system stops "scru-
pulously defending the rights of offenders" while ignoring the
rights of victims and witnesses. 144
In response to this desire for clarifying the role of victims
and witnesses in the criminal justice system, some jurisdic-
tions have drafted and passed legislation which calls for a
"victim's bill of rights." 145 Additionally, the judiciary has
sought to define the role that it should play in ensuring that
victims and witnesses are treated with respect and fairness. 146
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court recently
recognized the legitimate interests and concerns of victims. In
Morris v. Slappy,147 the Court stated:
In its haste to create a novel Sixth Amendment right, the
[lower] court failed to take into account the interests of the
victims of the crimes in not undergoing the ordeal of yet a
third trial in this case. Of course, inconvenience and embar-
rassment to witnesses cannot justify failing to enforce consti-
tutional rights of the accused .... But in the administration
of criminal justice, courts may not ignore the concerns of
victims. Apart from all other factors, such a course would
hardly encourage victims to report violations to the proper
authorities. 48
This statement reflects the current attitude toward victims
and witnesses in the criminal justice system. While they will
not be allowed to usurp the constitutional rights of the defend-
ant, they will not be overlooked any longer either. By provid-
ing victims and witnesses with rights in the process, it is likely
that victim and witness participation will increase. 149 In turn,
the overall attitude toward the criminal justice system will
improve.
144. Anderson & Woodard, supra note 6, at 221.
145. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text. For an example of a "victim's
bill of rights," see Wis. STAT. §§ 950.01-.07 (1983-84).
146. See What Judges and Lawyers Can Do, supra note 42, at 12-15.
147. 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
148. Id. at 14.
149. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2516.
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IV. FUTURE CONSIDERATION FOR THE
VICTIM RIGHTS MOVEMENT
The victim rights movement has achieved considerable
success in recent years, yet the future success of the movement
depends upon the coordination of three important aspects of
victim assistance programs. First, there must be greater ef-
forts made to coordinate the programs between jurisdictions.
Second, the continued active involvement of the judiciary is
necessary if the programs are to assure that victim needs are
met without infringing on the constitutional rights of the ac-
cused. Third, there is a need for the development of a long
term program which takes into consideration the operational
and financial impact of these programs on the criminal justice
agencies responsible for implementing these programs.
A. Victim Rights at the State Level
"In order to maintain and to strengthen our democratic sys-
tem of law and order, it is essential that the rights of the
victim of a crime should be just as fully protected as the
rights of the criminal offender."150
In recognition of the civic and moral duty of victims and
witnesses of crime to fully and voluntarily cooperate with
law enforcement... [the legislative intent of this chapter is]
to ensure that all victims and witnesses of crime are treated
with dignity, respect, courtesy and sensitivity; and that the
rights extended ... are honored and protected by law en-
forcement agencies, prosecutors and judges in a manner no
less vigorous than the protections afforded criminal
defendants. 151
Many states have passed legislation similar to the above
provisions in order to assist victims and witnesses of crime.
State legislatures have been especially responsive to the needs
of victims and witnesses.1 12 Almost every state has some form
of victim compensation program.1 53 A growing number have
150. Wis. STAT. § 949.001 (1983-84).
151. Wis. STAT. § 950.01 (1983-84).
152. Anderson & Woodard, supra note 6, at 222.
153. Id. For an example of a state victim compensation law, see Wis. STAT.
§§ 949.001-.18 (1983-84); see also supra note 7.
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adopted "victim's bill of rights" legislation.154 In addition,
states have acted aggressively to pass legislation to protect cer-
tain classes of victims, such as sexually and physically abused
children and women. 155 States view the use of victim assis-
tance as one way to improve the overall effectiveness of the
criminal justice system. 156
Wisconsin was the first state to define by statute some of
the government's obligations to victims and witnesses. 157 Wis-
consin's basic "bill of rights" is the model statute which most
states have used in drafting their own statutes.15 8 In addition,
the American Bar Association has been very active in the de-
velopment of victim/witness legislation. 59 This involvement
is helpful for the long term considerations of victim rights be-
cause it promotes consistency in state legislation.
The future success of these programs will depend upon the
development of a consistent and comprehensive approach to
victim assistance. Therefore, the coordination of programs
between the states as well as between the state and national
levels will be an important factor in determining whether the
victim rights movement attains nationwide success.
B. Judicial Involvement and Victim Rights
"Justice, though due to the accused, is due the accuser also.
The concept of fairness must not be strained til it is a fila-
ment. We are to keep the balance true."' 6 °
Undoubtedly, judges, on their own, can only do so much
to assist victims and witnesses of crime. Victim assistance
programs can supplement judicial efforts in this area. 16 1
154. See supra note 7. For an example of a state statute giving rights to the victims
and witnesses of crime, see Wis. STAT. §§ 950.01-.07 (1983-84); see also supra notes 81-
90 and accompanying text and supra note 8.
155. Anderson & Woodard, supra note 6, at 233-36; see supra note 9.
156. Anderson & Woodard, supra note 6, at 244.
157. WISCONSIN VICTIM/WITNESS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 34, at 1.
158. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 38, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2544.
159. See Victim/Witness Legislation: Considerations for Policymakers, 1981 A.B.A.
SEC. CRIM. JUST. 1; see also Bar Leadership on Victim Witness Assistance, 1980 A.B.A
SEC. CRIM. JUST. 1.
160. Finn, supra note 22, at 196 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
122 (1934) (J. Cardozo writing for the majority)).
161. Finn, supra note 22, at 192.
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Judges, because of the unique role they play in the criminal
justice system, are in the best position to assure that victim
and witness needs are met. As the criminal justice system is
composed of separate, independent agencies, the judiciary is in
a good position to coordinate activities in order to help vic-
tims of crime and better protect society as a whole. 162
The judiciary, at both the state and national level, is taking
an active role in defining the role of judges in victim assist-
ance.16 3 Emphasis is not only placed on the need to develop
cooperation in the criminal process, but also on the need to
explain the reasons for taking this active role in the develop-
ment of victim assistance programs.' 64
The major reasons given for judicial involvement in this
area are: judges stand to benefit in terms of facilitating and
expediting court operations; legislative mandates for victim
assistance require judicial involvement; and assisting victims
allows judges the opportunity to experience the personal satis-
faction of aiding individuals in crisis.1 65 As the courts are
charged with the responsibility to successfully bring offenders
to trial, judicial leadership in victim assistance programs is
important.
The future success of victim programs depends upon their
acceptance in the courtroom. Therefore, judges are a key fac-
tor in the long term effects of victim/witness legislation on the
criminal justice system. Unless the judicial branch is willing
to endorse and implement victim rights in the courtrooms of
this nation, it is unlikely that there will be a significant change
in attitude toward the system by victims and witnesses. In
turn, this will not encourage citizen participation. The bene-
fits which could come from a strong commitment to victim
rights will not be realized. Therefore, the judiciary must con-
tinue to take an active part in victim rights programs if the
programs are to be effective.
162. Id. at 194.
163. See id. at 192-98; see also What Judges and Lawyers Can Do, supra note 42, at
12-15. For one state supreme court judge's view on the victims' right movement, see
Abrahamson, supra note 22, at 517-67. The Honorable Shirley S. Abrahamson serves
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
164. Finn, supra note 22, at 194.
165. Id. at 195-97; see also What Judges and Lawyers Can Do, supra note 42, at 12-
15; Herrington, supra note 3, at 17-19.
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C. Impact of Victim Rights on the System
In order to assure the development of successful nation-
wide victim and witness programs, it is imperative that state
legislatures and other policymakers give attention to the long
as well as short range operational and financial implications
that these new programs will have for the criminal justice sys-
tem. 166 This effort to ascertain national and state goals in the
development of victim assistance programs must seriously
consider a number of concerns which have been expressed.
One concern is that there will not be sufficient resources to
meet the demands placed on the system by these programs.
Another concern is that the existing procedures in the system
are not sufficient to collect and distribute the kind of informa-
tion necessary to support victim and witness programs and
research.1 67 The development of long term programs, coordi-
nated between the jurisdictions, can do much to alleviate these
concerns. It will be necessary to do so if the victim rights
movement is to have a lasting, positive effect on the criminal
justice system.
V. CONCLUSION
In the past decade, there has been much concern expressed
as to the treatment of victims and witnesses of the criminal
justice system. Recent legislation at both the state and na-
tional level has done much to assure that victims of crime are
remembered in the criminal process. Constitutional chal-
lenges to such legislation have failed. In addition, the judici-
ary is now actively involved in clarifying the role of victims
and witnesses in the courtroom. A strong, nationwide victim/
witness assistance movement has achieved remarkable
success. 168
166. Anderson & Woodard, supra note 6, at 244.
167. Id. For a discussion of some of the concerns that need to be addressed if the
victims' rights movement is to achieve nationwide success, see id. at 237-44.
168. Id. This remarkable success is evident from the following information. From
1973 to 1983, the number of state-funded victim compensation programs grew from 9 to
39. During that same period, the number of victim service programs grew from a hand-
ful of programs to thousands of programs throughout the country. Additionally, statu-
tory rights for victims are now defined in 12 states and at the federal level through the
VWPA. Young, supra note 3, at 9-10.
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Nevertheless, in order for the victim programs to be effec-
tive in the long term, there must be an even greater focus
placed on the coordination of programs between the states as
well as between the state and national levels. Additionally,
the judicial branch must continue to take an active role in the
development of these programs. This aspect is even more cru-
cial due to the form of criminal justice applied in the United
States. The judiciary, from its impartial perspective, is in the
best position to assure that the rights of the accused are prop-
erly balanced with those of the victim.
Finally, one of the current problems recognized by the vic-
tim rights movement is that there has not been sufficient atten-
tion paid to the operational and financial impact of the new
programs on the criminal justice agencies responsible for im-
plementing the programs. 169 Recent federal and state legisla-
tion indicates that there is continued financial support for
victim programs. 170 Nevertheless, in order to assure contin-
ued support for victim/witness programs, there is a need for
the development, at both the state and national level, of a long
range program which would address these financial and oper-
atioial concerns. If such a long range approach is developed
for victim assistance programs, the success of the victim rights
movement will be evident in the significant and positive im-
pact it will have on the criminal justice system.
ANNE M. MORGAN
169. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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